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The previous discussion has ranked the indicators, be it the individual indicators or the 
composite index, according to their ability to predict crises while producing few false alarms. 
However, such criteria do not speak to the lead time of the signal.  From the vantage point of a 
policymaker who wants to implement pre-emptive measures he/she will not be indifferent 
between an indicator that sends signals well before the crisis occurs and one that signals only 
when the crisis is imminent.  Parallels are to be found in the Conference Board’s composite 
indices for the United States, which are published on a monthly basis.  Clearly, both financial 
market participants and policy makers alike find the leading indicator composite index more 
valuable than the coincident and lagging indices.  Market participants incorporate this 
information in their  investment decisions while policy makers give it weight in their policy 
reaction. Over the years, monetary policy in the United States, at least, has become increasingly 
forward-looking and hence pre-emptive rather than reactive. In part, this transition was made 
possible the fact that collectively the economics profession has gained a better understanding of 
the business cycle and early signs of its cycle turning points. 
  In focusing on the 24-month window prior to the onset of the crisis, the criteria for 
ranking the indicators presented in Chapters 3-5 does not distinguish between a signal given 12 
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months prior to the crisis and one given one month prior to the crisis.  In what follows we 
examine this issue, by tabulating for each of the monthly indicators the average number of 
months in advance of the crisis when the first signal occurs; this, of course, does not preclude 
the fact that the indicator may continue to give signals through the entire period immediately 
preceding the crisis.  Indeed, for the more reliable indicators signals tend to become 
increasingly persistent ahead of crises.  For the low frequency indicators, this is not much of an 
issue since some of these are published with a considerable lag and, hence, these tend to be of 
less use from an early warning standpoint. 
 
Is there scope for preemptive policy? 
Table 8.1 presents the results for both currency and banking crises.  For currency crises, 
the most striking observation about these results is that, on average, all the indicators send the 
first signal anywhere between a year and a year-and-a-half before the crisis erupts, with banking 
sector problems (our secondly-ranked indicator) offering the longest lead time–19 months. The 
average lead time for these early signals is 15.1 months for currency crises. Hence, on this basis, 
all the indicators considered are leading rather than coincident, which is consistent with the 
spirit of an “early warning system.”   For banking crises there is a greater dispersion in the lead 
time across indicators and the average lead is also lower (11.6 months).   
The main conclusion that follows from the discussion above is that the signals approach 
can be useful as the basis for an early warning system of a country’s vulnerability to a 
currency crisis and, to a lesser degree, banking crises. Within this approach, a number of 
indicators, as well as a composite index, have shown to be helpful in anticipating crises. From 
the vantage point of an early warning system, the results are encouraging in that the signaling, 
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on average, occurs sufficiently early to allow for pre-emptive policy actions.   
Table 8.1 How leading are the signals? 
(Average number of months from which the first signal is issued to the crisis month) 
 
 
Indicator 
 
Currency Crisis 
 
Banking Crisis 
 
Bank deposits 
 
15 
 
8 
 
Beginning of banking crisis 
 
19 
 
n.a. 
 
Domestic credit/GDP 
 
12 
 
7 
 
Domestic-foreign interest rate 
differential 
 
14 
 
16 
 
“Excess” M1 balances 
 
15 
 
6 
 
Exports 
 
15 
 
16 
 
Imports 
 
16 
 
11 
 
Lending/deposit interest rate ratio 
 
13 
 
6 
 
M2 multiplier 
 
16 
 
12 
 
M2/reserves 
 
13 
 
14 
 
Output 
 
16 
 
13 
 
Real exchange rate1 
 
17 
 
10 
 
Real interest rate 
 
17 
 
16 
 
Reserves 
 
15 
 
10 
 
Stock prices 
 
14 
 
12 
 
Terms-of-trade 
 
15 
 
18 
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Limitations and scope for future research 
In this book we have stressed that an effective warning system for financial crises should 
take into account a broad variety of indicators, as these crises are, for the most part, preceded by 
symptoms that arise in a number of areas. We have stressed indicators of financial sector stress. 
Perhaps, one of the reasons why some of the Asian crises had such an element of surprise had to 
do with the narrowness of the “traditional” definition of what was the relevant set of economic 
indicators. Indeed, this traditional view attached much weight to the role of fiscal policy and 
granted comparatively little weight to financial markets. Indicators that have proven to be 
particularly useful in anticipating currency crises include the behavior of the real exchange rate, 
stock prices, exports, output, and the ratio of M2 (a proxy for short-term debt) to international 
reserves.  Real interest rates, and the money multiplier appear to do better for banking crises. 
Needless to say, there is much scope for improving upon and complementing these 
results.  Higher frequency data on the extent of short term debt, which appears to be a key 
source of vulnerability in many of these episodes remains largely unavailable.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, there appears to be a great deal of scope for incorporating microeconomic data, 
including but not limited to banking and corporate sector balance sheet items. 
This book has summarized the workings of a specific early warning system for currency 
and banking crises. This system basically involves monitoring the behavior of a number of 
indicators, and recording the “signals” issued by these indicators as they move beyond certain 
threshold levels. A continuous measure of the probability of a currency or banking can also be 
traced.  On any given month, the system would estimate the probability of a crisis within the 
following 24 months conditional on the type of indicators issuing signals at that moment. Since 
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the group of indicators that are issuing signals would be identified, this would provide 
information about the source and breath of the problems that underlie the probability of a crisis. 
The evidence presented in this book, part of which is based on the out-of-sample forecasting 
performance of this approach, has provided some support for the signals approach in identifying 
which countries are most vulnerable to crisis at a point in time as well as how that vulnerability 
evolves over time–contagion notwithstanding. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that while an early warning system would be an 
useful tool for a timely assessment of the likelihood of a currency crisis, any such system is also 
subject to limitations. There could be a number of issues, including of a political and 
institutional nature, that may be relevant for a particular country at a particular moment in time, 
and which are not incorporated in a more systematic or mechanical approach, such as that 
delineated here. A comprehensive assessment of the situation would necessarily need to take 
those issues into account. Only then it would be possible to have a coherent interpretation of 
events and a firm base for policy decisions. 
 
Issues regarding the publication and use of such early warning indicators 
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A concern, often voiced in policy circles, as regards the desirability of making such 
indices of vulnerability publicly available on a timely basis, is that deteriorating readings may 
prompt a self-fulfilling run on a country’s currency or its banks.  While this consideration merits 
some concern, the conditions for generating self-fulfilling runs are likely to be relatively rare.  
As we have stressed throughout this book, the signals approach is useful in identifying cases of 
high vulnerability to crises–explaining the timing of the crises remains an elusive goal.  To the 
extent that timing matters and investment decisions are made under uncertainty, there is little 
reason to expect that moderate increases in the extent of vulnerability are likely to prompt a 
speculative attack. Negative announcements of the readings in the leading indicator index do 
not cause a recession, although investors certainly take into account these readings.   
Of course, a drastic rise on a given month in the vulnerability index could be a powerful 
“sell” signal.  However, the analysis presented here and in Kamisnky and Reinhart (1996) 
suggest such sudden and marked declines in fundamentals ahead of the crisis are rare (these 
could be linked to contagion).  Indeed, the build-up of economic and financial fragility in the 
periods preceding crises appears to be a gradual protracted process.  Needless to say, once the 
crisis has begun is a different matter and the volatile behavior of most indicators and sudden 
implosion of economic activity is consistent with the predictions of many multiple equilibria 
theories.  But that, is after the crisis. 
Another issue that surfaces in the discussion of early warning systems is that, to the 
extent that the relevant authorities heed the signals of distress, the indicators are likely to lose 
some of their predictive ability.  The loss of usefulness will certainly occur if:  i) preemptive 
policy is an every-time and everywhere phenomenon; ii) preemptive policy is successful in 
stalling off the crisis.  These are strong assumptions.  First, policy makers are all too often 
inclined to ignore distress signals on the grounds that, this time, the situation is really different 
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or on the basis of political objectives. Second, even if the signals are heeded, the crisis may not 
be averted. While avoiding the crisis is, no doubt, a goal to be aspired to–realistically, what 
policy may succeed in delivering is a softer landing.  Given the severity of the recent crises, this 
in itself may be classified as a success. 
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 APPENDIX A: DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
Crisis index: The index is a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve changes, with 
weights such that the two components of the index have equal conditional volatilities.  Since 
changes in the exchange rate enter with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a 
negative weight attached, readings of this index that were three standard deviations or more 
above the mean were cataloged as crises.  For countries in the sample that had hyperinflation, 
the construction of the index was modified.  While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic 
for a country with low-to-moderate inflation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace 
during hyperinflations.  A single index for the countries that had hyperinflation episodes would 
miss sizable devaluations and reserve losses in the moderate inflation periods, since the historic 
mean is distorted by the high-inflation episode.  To avoid this, we divided the sample according 
to whether inflation in the previous six months was higher than 150 percent and then 
constructed an index for each subsample.  Our cataloging of crises for these countries coincides 
fairly tightly with our chronology of currency market disruptions. Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz (1995) also include interest rates in this index, however, our data on 
market-determined interest rates for developing countries does not span the entire sample. 
The indicators: 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund; Emerging 
Market Indicators, International Finance Corporation (IFC); World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank, when data was missing from these sources, central bank bulletins and other 
country-specific sources were used as supplements.  Unless otherwise noted, we used 12-month 
percent changes. 
1. M2 multiplier: The ratio of M2 to base money, (IFS lines 34 plus 35) divided by IFS line 14. 
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2.  Domestic credit/nominal GDP: IFS line 52 divided by  IFS line 99b (interpolated).  Monthly 
nominal GDP was interpolated from annual or quarterly data.  
3.  Real interest rates on deposits: IFS line 60l, monthly rates, deflated using consumer prices 
(IFS line 64) expressed in percentage points.  
4. The ratio of lending rates to deposit rates: IFS line 60p divided by  IFS line60l; was used in 
lieu of differentials to ameliorate the distortions caused by the large percentage point spreads 
observed during high inflation.  In levels. 
  5.  “Excess” real balances: M1 (IFS line34) deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64) less an 
estimated demand for money.  The demand for real balances is determined by real GDP 
(interpolated IFS line99b), domestic consumer price inflation, and a time trend.  Domestic 
inflation was used in lieu of nominal interest rates, as market-determined interest rates were not 
available during the entire sample for a number of countries; the time trend (which can enter 
log-linearly, linearly, or exponentially) is motivated by its role as a proxy for financial 
innovation and/or currency substitution.  Excess money supply (demand) during pre-crisis 
periods (mc) is reported as a percent relative to excess supply (demand) during tranquil times 
(mt)--that is, 100 x (mc-mt)/mt. 
6.  M2 (in US dollars)/reserves (in US dollars): IFS lines 34 plus 35 converted into dollars 
(using IFS line ae) divided by  IFS line 1L.d. 
7.  Bank deposits: IFS line 24 plus 25.  
8.  Exports (in US dollars): IFS line 70. 
9.  Imports (in US dollars): IFS line 71. 
10. The terms of trade: the unit value of exports (IFS line 74) over the unit value of imports 
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(IFS line 75).  For those developing countries where import unit values (or import price indices) 
were not available, an index of prices of manufactured exports from industrial countries to 
developing countries was used. 
11.  The real exchange rate: This measure used is based on consumer price indexes (IFS lines 
64) and is defined as the relative price of foreign goods (in domestic currency) to the price of 
domestic goods.  If the central bank of the home country pegs the currency to the dollar 
(Deutsche mark), the relevant foreign price index is that of the United States (Germany). Hence, 
for all the European countries the foreign price index is that of Germany while for all the other 
countries, consumer prices in the United States were used. The trend was specified as, 
alternatively, log-linear, linear, and exponential; the best fit among these was selected on a 
country-by-country basis.  Deviations from trend during crisis periods (dc) were compared to 
the deviations during tranquil times (dt) and are shown in Figures 2 and 3 as a percent of the 
deviations in tranquil times (i.e.,100 x (dc-dt)/dt). 
12.  Reserves: IFS line 1L.d. 
13.  Domestic-foreign interest rate differential on deposits: Monthly rates in percentage 
points. IFS lines 60l. Interest rates in the home country are compared with interest rates in the 
United States (Germany) if the domestic central bank pegs the currency to the dollar (Deutsche 
mark).  The real interest rate is given by 100 x [((1+ it)pt /pt+1-1]. 
  19 
14.  Output: For most countries, the measure of output used is industrial production (IFS 
line 66).  However, for some countries (the commodity exporters) an index of output of 
primary commodities is used (IFS lines 66aa). 
15: Stock returns (in dollars): IFC global indices are used for all emerging markets; for 
industrial countries the quotes from the main bourses are used.  
16.  Overall budget balance/GDP: Consolidated public sector balance as share of 
nominal GD 
 
 
 
 
